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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new extension of the run-to-the-bank
rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of multi-issue allocation
situations. We show that this rule always yields a core element and
that it satisﬁes self-duality. We characterise our rule by means of a
new consistency property, issue-consistency.
Key words: cooperative games, multi-issue allocation, bankruptcy,
self-duality, consistency.
1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy situation (O’Neill (1982)), one has to divide a given amount
of money (estate) amongst a set of agents, each of whom has a claim on the
estate. The total amount claimed typically exceeds the estate available, so
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1Corresponding author
1not all the claims of the agents can be fully satisﬁed. Calleja et al. (2001)
extend this model to encompass situations in which the agents can have
multiple claims on the estate, each as a result of a particular issue. For such
multi-issue allocation situations they propose an extension of the run-to-the-
bank rule of O’Neill as solution for this new class of problems. As is the case
for the original rule, this extended run-to-the-bank rule turns out to coincide
with the Shapley value of the corresponding multi-issue allocation game.
Contrary to bankruptcy games, however, multi-issue allocation games
need not be convex. Consequently, there exist multi-issue allocation situ-
ations for which the run-to-the-bank solution is not a core element of the
corresponding game. In this paper, we extend the run-to-the-bank rule in a
diﬀerent way, such that it always yields a core element.
Instead of considering the issues and the players combined, as in Calleja
et al. (2001), we propose a two-stage extension: ﬁrst, we explicitly allocate
the estate to the issues (according to a marginal vector), and then, within
each issue the money is divided among the agents using the standard run-to-
the-bank rule. An alternative view on composite solution is given in Casas-
M´ endez et al. (2002).
Based on Aumann and Maschler (1985), we deﬁne the concept of (self-)
duality for multi-issue allocation situations and show that both extensions of
the run-to-the-bank-rule are self-dual. Finally, we characterise our composite
extension by means of the property of issue-consistency, which generalises the
consistency property that was ﬁrst used by O’Neill (1982).
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the bankruptcy
and multi-issue allocation models and deﬁne the bankruptcy run-to-the-bank
rule. In section 3, we deﬁne our composite extension of this rule and show
that this yields a core element. In section 4, we deﬁne self-duality and prove
that both extensions of the run-to-the-bank rule satisfy this property. Finally,
in section 5, we characterise the composite run-to-the-bank rule by means of
issue-consistency and we show that this rule is monotonic.
2 Multi-issue allocation situations
A bankruptcy situation (O’Neill (1982)) is a triple (N;E;c), where N =
f1;:::;ng is the set of players, E ¸ 0 is the estate under contest and c 2 RN
+
is the vector of claims such that
P
i2N ci ¸ E.
With each bankruptcy situation (N;E;c) a bankruptcy game can be as-
sociated with set of players N and characteristic function vE;c, which assigns
2to each coalition S ½ N the part of the estate that is left for the players in
S after the claims of the other players have been satisﬁed, ie,




for all S ½ N.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation (Calleja et al. (2001)) is a
quadruplet (N;R;E;C), where N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players, R =
f1;:::;rg is the set of issues, E ¸ 0 is the estate and C 2 R
R£N
+ is the
matrix of claims. We assume that
P
k2R;i2N cki ¸ E,
P
k2R cki > 0 for all
i 2 N and
P
i2N cki > 0 for all k 2 R.
Given a matrix C, we denote by Ci the ith row of C, and by C¡i the matrix
C without the ith row. Furthermore, we denote ckS =
P
i2S cki for S ½ N
and cKi =
P
k2K cki for K ½ R. In this way the sum of the components of
Ci is denoted by ciN, and the total claim of player i 2 N is cRi.
A permutation ¿ on R is a bijection ¿ : f1;:::;rg ! R, where ¿(p)
denotes which element of R is at position p. The set of all r! permutations
on R is denoted by Π(R). The reverse permutation of ¿, ¿rev 2 Π(R) is
deﬁned by ¿rev(p) = ¿(n + 1 ¡ p) for all p 2 f1;:::;rg.
For a MIA situation (N;R;E;C), we deﬁne a corresponding MIA game
by assigning to each coalition S the minimum amount they can guarantee
themselves if the players in NnS are free to choose an order on the issues
and the players, where we assume that an issue cannot be dealt with until
the previous one is completed. Given an order on the issues ¿ 2 Π(R), we




c¿(p)N · Eg: (1)
So, the issues ¿(1);:::;¿(t¿) will be entirely satisﬁed for all the players,
whereas the issue ¿(t¿ + 1) will only be partially satisﬁed, with the amount
E¿ = E¡
Pt¿
p=1 c¿(p)N. The remaining issues are not handled at all according




c¿(p)S + maxf0;E¿ ¡ c¿(t¿+1)NnSg:




3for all S ½ N. Note that this MIA game corresponds to the Q-approach in
Calleja et al. (2001).
A bankruptcy situation (N;E;c) can be viewed as a MIA situation (N;R;E;C)
in two ways:
² jRj = 1 and C = c,
² R = N and C = diag(c), ie, the claim matrix is the diagonal matrix
with the elements of c on the diagonal.
A bankruptcy rule is a function f assigning to every bankruptcy situation
(N;E;c) a vector f(N;E;c) 2 RN such that:
i) 0 · fi(N;E;c) · ci for all i 2 N,
ii)
P
i2N fi(N;E;c) = E.
A well-known example of a bankruptcy rule is the run-to-the-bank (RTB)
rule, introduced by O’Neill (1982), although under a diﬀerent name (recursive
completion). This rule turns out to coincide with the Shapley value of the
corresponding bankruptcy game. In Section 3 we give a deﬁnition of this
rule.
A MIA rule is a function g assigning to every MIA situation (N;R;E;C)
a vector g(N;R;E;C) 2 RN such that
i) 0 · gi(N;R;E;C) · cRi for all i 2 N,
ii)
P
i2N gi(N;R;E;C) = E.
Calleja et al. (2001) extend the RTB rule to the class of MIA situations and
show that this RTB rule coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding
MIA game.
3 The composite run-to-the-bank rule
In this section, we extend the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations to the
class of MIA situations. Contrary to the extension in Calleja et al. (2001),
our rule (mRTB) involves multiple runs to the bank, once by the issues and
within each issue by the players.
This two-stage procedure is illustrated in the following picture, where f
and g are bankruptcy rules:
4(R;E;(ckN)k2R)
f



































The bankruptcy game corresponding to the situation (R;E;(ckN)k2R) will
be denoted by vR
E;C.
In order to introduce the mRTB rule, we ﬁrst deﬁne the RTB rule in
terms of marginal vectors. Given a cooperative game with player set N
and characteristic function v, we deﬁne for each permutation ¾ 2 Π(N) the
marginal vector m¾(v) by
m
¾
¾(p)(v) = v(f¾(1);:::;¾(p)g) ¡ v(f¾(1);:::;¾(p ¡ 1)g)
for all p 2 f1;:::;ng.
The run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy games, RTB, coincides with the








Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. For ¿ 2 Π(R) and ¾ 2 Π(N), we







where x = m¿(vR
E;C):
The set of all composite marginal vector is a subset of the core of the
corresponding MIA game, where the core of a game v is deﬁned by








Proposition 1 Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. Then
mm
¿;¾(N;R;E;C) 2 Core(vE;C)
for all ¿ 2 Π(R), ¾ 2 Π(N).
5Proof. Let ¿ 2 Π(R);¾ 2 Π(N) and let z = mm¿;¾(N;R;E;C). Let x
be the marginal vector m¿(vR
E;C) and t = t¿ (as deﬁned in (1)). With xk
as estate for issue k 2 R, we have a collection of bankruptcy situations
f(N;xk;Ck)gk2R. However, at most one of them is a nontrivial situation: in
the situations ¿(1);:::;¿(t) the estate equals the sum of all the claims and in
the situations ¿(t+2);:::;¿(r) the estate equals zero. Let y be the marginal




We can express vector z as




Given a coalition S ½ N we have deﬁned vE;C(S) as min¿2Π(R) fS(¿), but P
i2S zi is precisely fS(¿) if in the permutation ¾ the players in S are at the
end, and for any other permutation this amount is larger or equal. Hence, P
i2S zi ¸ vE;C(S) for all S ½ N, and so, z is in the core of vE;C. 2
A general relation of inclusion between the set of marginal vectors and
the set of composite marginal vectors cannot be established, as is shown the
following example.
Example 1 Let (N;R;E;C) be the MIA situation with N = f1;2;3g, R =
f1;2g, estate E = 10 and claim matrix C = ( 9 5 0
3 7 7). The game associated
with this situation is
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
vE;C(S) 0 0 0 3 3 1 10
The sets of marginal and composite marginal vectors can be easily calculated.
The results are given in the following tables.














6The tables show that m231(vE;C) is not a composite marginal vector and that
mm12;213(N;R;E;C) does not belong to the set of marginal vectors of the
game vE;C. 2
Now we deﬁne the mRTB rule, which extends the RTB rule for bankruptcy
situations to the class of MIA situations.
Deﬁnition 1 Let (N;R;E;C) be a multi-issue allocation situation. The













The mRTB rule can be interpreted as the result of two races: ﬁrst, the
issues “run to the bank” for the money, and next, there are r races among the
claimants within each issue. As is the case for the RTB rule for bankruptcy
situations, the claims are satisﬁed as much as possible by the order of arrival.
This mRTB rule ﬁrst takes the marginal vectors of the “issue game” vR
E;C.
Associated with each marginal vector m¿(vR
E;C) we have r bankruptcy games
whose estates are given by the components of the marginal vector. Next,
we take for each player the sum of the RTB solutions of these r situations.
Finally, the average among all the marginals is computed. It is readily seen












It is easy to see that if we start with a bankruptcy situation (N;E;c)
and construct one of the two corresponding MIA situations (N;R;E;C) as
indicated in Section 2, then RTB(N;E;c) = mRTB(N;R;E;C). So, the
mRTB rule is indeed an extension of the RTB rule. However, the mRTB
rule does not in general coincide with the Shapley value of the game. In fact,
the mRTB rule is not even game-theoretic, ie, two situations leading to the
same game might yield diﬀerent outcomes.
The mRTB rule provides a very easy way of obtaining an element of the
core of a MIA game without calculating the characteristic function. This is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. Then
mRTB(N;R;E;C) 2 Core(vE;C):
7Proof. In Proposition 1, we show that every composite marginal vector lies
in the core. The mRTB outcome, being the average of these composite
marginals vectors according to equation (3), then also is an element of the
core, which is a convex set. 2
As an alternative to the mRTB rule, another way to extend the RTB rule
in a two-stage way would be to apply the RTB rule twice:
P
k2R RTB(N;xk;Ck)
with x = RTB(R;E;(ckN)k2R). However, this solution can lie outside the
core of the corresponding MIA game, as the next example shows.
Example 2 Consider the MIA situation (N;R;E;C) with N = f1;2;3g,









The game associated with this situation is
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
vE;C(S) 16 3 22 21 46 27 51









6 ). As 5
2 < 3 = vE;C(f2g), this solution is not in the core of vE;C. 2
4 Self-duality
For a MIA situation (N;R;E;C) we denote by D(S) = cRS, ie, the total
claim of the players in coalition S, and we deﬁne D = D(N). Recall that we
assume D ¸ E.
Lemma 1 Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. Then
vE;C(S) = vD¡E;C(NnS) + D(S) ¡ D + E:
Proof. To calculate the value of vE;C(S), we must ﬁnd a permutation on the
players ¾ 2 Π(N) and a permutation on the issues ¿ 2 Π(R) such that the
total amount assigned to coalition S is minimal. Obviously, ¾ can be any
permutation in which the players in S are at the end.
In Figure 1 we represent all the claims of matrix C in the order indicated
by ¿ and ¾, ie, c¿(1)¾(1);c¿(1)¾(2);:::;c¿(r)¾(n). The claims associated with






 - E  - D ¡ E
Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 1
lengths E and D ¡ E, as the ﬁgure shows. From the way in which ¾ and
¿ are chosen, the dark zone in the E part is as small as possible, and it is
precisely vE;C(S).
If now we consider the MIA situation (N;R;D ¡ E;C) and we want to
calculate vD¡E;C(NnS), we must ﬁnd ¾0 2 Π(N) and ¿0 2 Π(R) such that
the white zone in the D ¡ E segment is minimised. The length of this zone
is indeed vD¡E;C(NnS). It is easy to see that this minimum is reached for
¾rev and ¿rev.
On the other hand, we have that the E segment is the sum of its white
and shaded parts. The white part within E will be the total white zone
D(NnS) minus the white zone in the D ¡E segment. The shaded part of E
is vE;C(S), as was indicated above. So,
E = vE;C(S) + D(NnS) ¡ vD¡E;C(NnS):
From the equality D = D(S) + D(N ¡ S), we conclude that the statement
holds. 2
The next lemma gives us the relation between the marginal vectors of the
two MIA games with estates E and D ¡ E.
Lemma 2 The marginal vectors of the games induced by the MIA situations
(N;R;E;C) and (N;R;D ¡ E;C) satisfy the following relationship:
m
¾(vE;C) = ((cRi)i2N) ¡ m
¾rev(vD¡E;C)
for each ¾ 2 Π(N).
Proof. Let ¾ 2 Π(N) and p 2 f1;:::;ng. Let i = ¾(p) and let S be the
coalition f¾(1);:::;¾(p ¡ 1)g. Then
m
¾
i (vE;C) = vE;C(S [ fig) ¡ vE;C(S):
9From Lemma 1 we have that
m
¾
i (vE;C) = vD¡E;C(Nn(S [ fig)) + D(S [ fig) ¡ D + E
¡[vD¡E;C(NnS) + D(S) ¡ D + E]
= D(fig) + vD¡E;C(Nn(S [ fig)) ¡ vD¡E;C(NnS)
= D(fig) ¡ m
¾rev
i (vD¡E;C):
Since D(fig) = cRi, the result follows. 2
Following Aumann and Maschler (1985), given a rule f we can deﬁne its
dual f¤ by using f to share not the estate E but the gap D ¡ E. So, each
player receives his claim (the part he would receive if the estate were big
enough) minus the corresponding part of the losses:
f
¤(N;R;E;C) = (cRi)i2N ¡ f(N;R;D ¡ E;C):
A rule is called self-dual if f¤ = f. We show that both extensions of the RTB
rule are self-dual.
Proposition 2 The RTB rule for MIA situations (cf. Calleja et al. (2001))
is self-dual.
Proof. Calleja et al. (2001) show that the RTB rule coincides with the





























= (cRi)i2N ¡ RTB(N;R;D ¡ E;C):
This shows that the RTB rule is self-dual. 2
As a result of the previous proposition, the RTB rule is self-dual for
bankruptcy situations as well, which was ﬁrst proved by Curiel (1988).
10Theorem 2 The mRTB rule is self-dual.
Proof. Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. We will denote by vR
E and
vR
D¡E the characteristic functions of the games induced by the bankruptcy
situations (N;E;(ckN)k2R) and (N;D ¡ E;(ckN)k2R), respectively. Then,






















































= (cRi)i2N ¡ mRTB(N;R;D ¡ E;C):
Hence, the mRTB rule is self-dual. 2
5 Issue consistency and monotonicity
In this section we characterise the mRTB rule as a consistent extension of
the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations to multi-issue allocations situations.
This so-called issue-consistency allows us to establish monotonicity of the
mRTB rule.
Deﬁnition 2 A bankruptcy rule f is called claim-consistent (cf. O’Neill











for all i 2 N.
If a rule is claim-consistent, the solution can be viewed as an average of n
payoﬀs. Each payoﬀ is calculated by ﬁxing a player j 2 N and giving him as
11much as possible, minfE;cjg; then, the remaining maxfE ¡ cj;0g is shared
among the other players.
This property determines a unique rule for bankruptcy situations: the
recursive completion method of O’Neill (1982), which coincides with the RTB
rule and, hence, with the Shapley value of the associated game.
For MIA situations we deﬁne a new kind of consistency. A rule is issue-
consistent if it can be expressed as an average of payoﬀs too, but now the
payoﬀs are calculated by ﬁxing an issue k 2 R and allocating to it the amount
minfE;ciNg, while the remaining estate is shared among the remaining is-
sues.
Deﬁnition 3 A MIA rule f is called issue-consistent if for each MIA situ-












Issue-consistency allows us to extend any rule deﬁned for bankruptcy
situations to MIA situations: the ﬁrst term of the summation in (5) ap-
plies the rule f to a (perhaps trivial) bankruptcy situation, while the second
term applies f to a MIA situation with r ¡ 1 issues, so the expression can
be recursively expanded until f is used only on bankruptcy situations (ie,
MIA situations with only one issue). Analogous to claim-consistency, every
bankruptcy rule has a unique issue-consistent extension.
Theorem 3 The mRTB rule is the issue-consistent extension of the RTB
rule.
Proof. Let (N;R;E;C) be a MIA situation. Then












For each permutation ¿ on the issues we split the second summation into one
























E;C) = minfE;c¿(1)Ng and there are (r ¡ 1)! permutations ¿ in




















The mRTB rule coincides with RTB if there is only one issue, ie,
RTB(N;minfE;ckNg;Ck) = mRTB(N;fkg;minfE;ckNg;Ck):







































This shows that that the mRTB rule is issue-consistent. This, together with
the uniqueness of issue-consistent extension, prove the result. 2
Issue-consistency allows us to show that the mRTB rule is monotonic. A
rule is called monotonic if no player gets less when the estate increase.
Deﬁnition 4 A MIA rule f is monotonic if for every pair of MIA situations
(N;R;E;C) and (N;R;E0;C) with E0 ¸ E we have that
fi(N;R;E
0;C) ¸ fi(N;R;E;C)
for all i 2 N.
13Theorem 4 The mRTB rule is monotonic.
Proof. We show that mRTB rule is monotonic by induction on the number of
issues r. If r = 1 then mRTB coincides with RTB and this rule is monotonic
on the class of banckruptcy games (Curiel (1988)).
Next, assume that mRTB is monotonic for situations with r ¡ 1 issues.








+ mRTB(N;Rnfkg;maxfE ¡ ckN;0g;C¡k)
i
:
In the ﬁrst term inside the brackets we actually apply the RTB rule to a
bankruptcy situation. So, by monotonicity of the RTB rule, this term in-
creases if the estate is raised. The second term is the application of mRTB
to a (r¡1)-issue allocation situation, which by the induction hypothesis sat-
isﬁes the monotonicity property. Adding up all terms, we have that mRTB
is monotonic. 2
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